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For other uses, see Iraq war (disambiguation).
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| Iran-Iraq War – Gulf War – Iraq War |
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| Kuwait – Khafji – 73 Easting – Al Busayyah – Phase Line Bullet – Medina Ridge – Wadi Al-Batin – Norfolk |
The Gulf War or Persian Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991)Frontline Chronology (PDF). Public Broadcasting Service. Retrieved on 2007-03-20.CNN, 16 January 2001 [2] was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force from 34 nationshttp://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/facts/gulfwar authorized by the United Nations (UN) and led primarily by the United States in order to return Kuwait to the control of the Emir of Kuwait.
The conflict developed in the context of the Iran-Iraq War. The entry by Iraqi troops in Kuwait was met with immediate economic sanctions by some members of the UN Security Council against Iraq. The expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait began in January 1991 and was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, which took over Kuwait and entered Iraqi territory. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait, and bordering areas of Saudi Arabia. Iraq also launched missiles against targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel in retaliation for their support of the invading forces in Kuwait.
Since the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 had been called the "Gulf War" or "Persian Gulf War" by many news sources, the 1991 war has sometimes been called the Second Gulf War, but more commonly, the 1991 war is styled simply the Gulf War or the "First Gulf War", in distinction from the 2003 Invasion of Iraq."Rescue Operations in the Second Gulf War", Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2005. Operation Desert Storm was the U.S. name of the air and land operations and is often used to refer to the conflict.
Seven days after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (soon to be succeeded by John Major, who remained in that position for the rest of the war) pressured President George H.W. Bush into intervening in Kuwait and then the United States started to deploy Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, and Coast Guard units to Saudi Arabia (they called this Operation Desert Shield), while at the same time urging other countries to send their own forces to the scene. UN coalition-building efforts were so successful that by the time the fighting (Operation Desert Storm) began on January 17 1991, twelve countries had sent naval forces, joining the regional states of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, as well as the huge array of the US Navy, which deployed six aircraft-carrier battle groups; eight countries had sent ground forces, joining the regional troops of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the seventeen heavy and six light brigades of the US Army and nine Marine regiments, with their large support and service forces; and four countries had sent combat aircraft, joining the local air forces of Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the US Air Force, US Navy, and U.S. Marine aviation, for a grand total of 2,430 fixed-wing aircraft.
Against them, the Iraqis had only a few gunboats and small missile craft to match the coalition\'s armada; but on the other hand, some 1.2 million ground troops with about 5,800 tanks, 5,100 other armored vehicles, and 3,850 artillery pieces made for a lot more strength on the ground . Iraq also had 750 fighters and bombers, 200 other aircraft, and elaborate missile and gun defenses.
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To the U.S., Iran-Iraqi relations were stable, and Iraq had been chiefly an ally of the Soviet Union. The US was concerned with Iraq’s focus on Israel\'s Palestinian policies and its disapproval of moves toward peace between Israel and Egypt. It also disliked Iraqi support for various Arab and Palestinian militant groups such as Abu Nidal, which led to its inclusion on the incipient U.S. list of state sponsors of international terrorism on December 29, 1979. The US remained officially neutral during the outbreak of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq War, although it assisted Iraq covertly. In March 1982, however, Iran began a successful counteroffensive (Operation Undeniable Victory). The US made a concerted effort to prevent Israel from getting involved so as not to inflame Arab countries angry with its policies. In a bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Ostensibly this was because of improvement in the regime’s record, although former United States Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel Koch later stated, "No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis\'] continued involvement in terrorism... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."Douglas A. Borer (2003). Inverse Engagement: Lessons from US-Iraq Relations, 1982–1990. U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection. U.S. Army. Retrieved on 2006-10-12. With Iran\'s newfound success in the war and its rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales to Iraq (which included poison gas which was then used against Iranian troops) from other states (most importantly the USSR, France, Egypt, and starting that year, the People\'s Republic of China) reached a record spike in 1982, but an obstacle remained to any potential US-Iraqi relationship — Abu Nidal continued to operate with official support in Baghdad. When Saddam Hussein expelled the group to Syria at the US\' request in November 1983, the Reagan administration then sent Donald Rumsfeld to Saddam Hussein as a special envoy to cultivate ties.
By the time the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was virtually bankrupt and heavily indebted to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Its vulnerability was made worse because the following year, in open defiance of OPEC quotas, Kuwait had increased its oil production by 40 percent. The collapse in oil prices had a catastrophic impact on the Iraqi economy. The Iraqi government described it as a form of economic warfare, which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait slant-drilling across the border into Iraq\'s Rumaila oil field [3].
Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman province of Basra, and although its ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to Britain, it did not make any attempt to secede from the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, Iraqi governments had always refused to accept Kuwait\'s separation, and its borders were never clearly defined or mutually agreed.[citation needed] The British High Commissioner drew lines that deliberately constricted Iraq\'s access to the ocean so that any future Iraqi government would be in no position to threaten Britain\'s domination of the Gulf [4].
In late July 1990, as negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait stalled, Iraq massed troops on its border with the emirate and summoned US ambassador April Glaspie to a meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Two transcripts of that meeting have been produced, both of them controversial. In them, Saddam Hussein outlined his grievances against Kuwait, while promising that he would not invade Kuwait before one more round of negotiations. In the version published by The New York Times on September 23, 1990, Glaspie expressed concern over the troop buildup to Saddam Hussein:
"We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late ’60s. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via [Chadli] Klibi [then Arab League General Secretary] or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly. With regard to all of this, can I ask you to see how the issue appears to us?
"My assessment after 25 years\' service in this area is that your objective must have strong backing from your Arab brothers. I now speak of oil. But you, Mr. President, have fought through a horrific and painful war. Frankly, we can see only that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned. And for this reason, I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship -- not in the spirit of confrontation -- regarding your intentions.
"I simply describe the position of my Government. And I do not mean that the situation is a simple situation. But our concern is a simple one."
Some have interpreted portions of these statements, particularly the language "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait", as signaling an American "green light" for the invasion. Although the US State Department did not confirm (or deny) the authenticity of these transcripts, US sources say that it handled everything “by the book” (in accordance with the US\' official neutrality on the Iraq-Kuwait issue) and had not signaled to Saddam Hussein any approval for defying the Arab League’s Jeddah crisis squad, which had conducted the negotiations. Many believe that Saddam Hussein may have been influenced by the perception that the US was not interested in the issue, (as they had not minded when he ordered the invasion of Iran) for which the Glaspie transcript is merely an example, and that he may have felt so in part because of U.S. support for the reunification of Germany, another act that he considered to be nothing more than the nullification of an artificial, internal border. Others, such as Kenneth Pollack, believe he had no such illusion, or that he simply underestimated the extent of a US response.
In November 1989, CIA director William Webster met with the Kuwaiti head of security, Brigadier Fahd Ahmed Al-Fahd. Subsequent to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Iraq claimed to have found a memorandum pertaining to their conversation. The Washington Post reported that Kuwait’s foreign minister fainted when confronted with this document at an Arab summit in August. Later, Iraq cited this memorandum as evidence of a CIA - Kuwaiti plot to destabilize Iraq economically and politically. The CIA and Kuwait have described the meeting as routine and the memorandum as a forgery. The purported document reads in part:
"We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country\'s government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level."
Saddam Hussein detained several Westerners, with video footage being shown on state television.
On 23 August 1990 Saddam Hussein appeared on state television with Western hostages to whom he had refused exit visas. They were seen as human shields, though Saddam Hussein denied the claim. In the video he is seen ruffling the hair of a young boy named as Stuart Lockwood and asks through the interpreter if he is "getting his milk". He went on to say "We hope your presence as guests here will not be for too long. Your presence here, and in other places, is meant to prevent the scourge of war."BBC News. "1990: Outrage at Iraqi TV hostage show". Accessed 2 September 2007.
three C-130s for EAF , USAF , RSAF.
Within hours of the invasion, Kuwaiti and US delegations requested a meeting of the UN Security Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On August 3, the Arab League passed its own resolution. The resolution also called for a solution to the conflict from within the League, and warned against foreign intervention. On August 6, UN Resolution 661 placed economic sanctions on Iraq.
The decision by the US and its allies to fight the Iraqi invasion had more to do with preventing an attack on Saudi Arabia, a nation of far more economic importance to the world than Kuwait, as it did with liberating Kuwait itself. The rapid success of the Iraqi army had brought it within easy striking distance of the Hama oil fields, Saudi Arabia’s most valuable resource. Iraqi control of these fields as well as Kuwait and Iraqi reserves would have given it control of the majority of the world\'s reserves. The Iraqi armored divisions would have encountered the same difficulties that Saudi forces faced defending the oil fields, namely traversing large distances across inhospitable desert. This would have been exacerbated by intense bombing by the Saudi Air Force, by far the most well-equipped (if not so well-trained) arm of the Saudi military.
Iraq had a number of grievances with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had lent Saddam Hussein some 26 billion dollars to prosecute his invasion of Iran, as they feared the influence of mainly Shia Iran\'s Islamic revolution on its own Shia minority (most of the Saudi oil fields are in territory that is populated by Shias). The long desert border was also ill-defined. Soon after his conquest of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein began verbally attacking the Saudi kingdom. He argued that the US-supported Saudi state was an illegitimate guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Saddam Hussein combined the language of the Islamist groups that had recently fought in Afghanistan with the rhetoric Iran had long used to attack the Saudis.
Acting on the policy of the Carter Doctrine, and out of fear the Iraqi army could launch an invasion of Saudi Arabia, Us President George H. W. Bush quickly announced that the US would launch a "wholly defensive" mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia—Operation Desert Shield—and US troops moved into Saudi Arabia on August 7 1990.The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Timeline. Retrieved on March 29, 2007. This "wholly defensive" doctrine was to be quickly abandoned. The BBC has a start date of the 8th August, while Frontline has 8th August as when the first US aircraft arrived in Saudi Arabia. Timeline of the Gulf War has the 7th August. On August 8, Iraq declared parts of Kuwait to be extensions of the Iraqi province of Basra and the rest to be the 19th province of Iraq.15 Years After Desert Storm, U.S. Commitment to Region Continues. Retrieved on March 29, 2007.
Within forty-eight hours of the initial invasion of Kuwait, P-3 Orions were the first US forces to arrive. One of these responding P-3’s was a prototype known as “Outlaw Hunter”. “Outlaw Hunter” was undergoing trials, in the Pacific Ocean, after being developed by the US Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. It was testing a highly specialized OTH-T (over the horizon targeting system package) when it immediately responded. During Desert Shield a P-3 using its advanced infra-red imaging was able to detect a ship with painted-out Iraqi markings under freshly painted, bogus, Egyptian markings trying to avoid detection. Several days before the January 7 1991 Desert Storm the ISAR P-3 conducted coastal surveillance along Iraq and Kuwait to provide pre-strike reconnaissance on military installations. Fifty-five of the one hundred and eight Iraqi vessels destroyed during the conflict were targeted by P-3. READE, DAVID (1998). THE AGE OF ORION THE LOCKHEED P-3 ORION STORY. ATGLEN, PA: SCHIFFER, 42-49. ISBN 0-7643-0478-X.
The United States Navy mobilized two naval battle groups, the aircraft carriers USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and USS Independence and their escorts, to the area, where they were ready by August 8. A total of 48 US Air Force F-15s from the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, landed in Saudi Arabia and immediately commenced round the clock air patrols of the Saudi-Kuwait-Iraq border areas to prevent further Iraqi advances. The U.S. also sent the battleships USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin to the region. Military buildup continued from there, eventually reaching 500,000 troops, twice the number used in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Much of the material was airlifted or carried to the staging areas via fast sealift ships, allowing a quick buildup. The consensus among military analysts is nonetheless that until October, the US military forces in the area would have been insufficient to stop an invasion of Saudi Arabia had Iraq attempted one.
A long series of UN Security Council resolutions and Arab League resolutions were passed regarding the conflict. One of the most important was Resolution 678, passed on November 29, giving Iraq a withdrawal deadline of January 15 1991, and authorizing “all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660,” a diplomatic formulation authorizing the use of force.
The United States, especially Secretary of State James Baker, assembled a coalition of forces to join it in opposing Iraq, consisting of forces from 34 countries: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States itself. Although they did not contribute any forces, Japan and Germany did make financial contributions totaling $10 billion and $6.6 billion respectively. US troops represented 74% of the coalition’s 1,660,000 troops in Iraq. Many of the coalition forces were reluctant to join; some felt that the war was an internal Arab affair, or feared increasing American influence in Kuwait. In the end, many nations were persuaded by Iraq’s belligerence towards other Arab states, and offers of economic aid or debt forgiveness.
The United States and the United Nations gave several public justifications for involvement in the conflict. The loudest reason was the Iraqi violation of Kuwaiti territorial integrity, although this did not seem to necessitate intervention in oil-free regions of the world. In addition, the United States moved quickly to support its long-time ally, the dictatorship of Saudi Arabia, whose importance in the region and as a key supplier of oil made it of considerable geopolitical importance.
During a speechhttp://millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/diglibrary/prezspeeches/ghbush/ghb_1990_0911.html given on September 11, 1990, George H.W. Bush made the following remarks: "Within 3 days, 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to act to check that aggression." Satellite photos showing a build up of Iraqi forces along the border were the source of this information.
Polls showed that upwards of 80% of the American public supported the troop deployment.http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-06-26-poll-results_x.htm The anti-war movement and its “No Blood For Oil” slogan did not achieve the levels of support it would get 12 years later.
Later (retrospective) justifications for the war included Iraq’s history of human rights abuses under Saddam Hussein, which did not seem to overly bother Western governments when they were occurring. Saddam Hussein was also known to possess chemical weapons supplied to him by Germany, which he had previously used first against Iranian troops and then the Kurds, as well as biological weapons, and like Israel was known to be attempting to build atomic bombs.
Although the human rights abuses of the Iraq regime during the Kuwait invasion were well-documented, the government of Kuwait set out to influence Us opinion with some false accounts. Shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the organization Citizens for a Free Kuwait was formed in the US It hired the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton for about $11 million, paid by the Kuwaiti government.http://www.prwatch.org/books/tsigfy10.html This firm went on to manufacture a campaign in which a nurse working in the Kuwait City hospital described Iraqi soldiers pulling babies out of incubators and letting them die on the floor. The story was an influence in tipping both the public and Congress towards a war with Iraq: six Congressmen said the testimony was enough for them to support military action against Iraq and seven Senators referenced the testimony in debate. The Senate supported the military actions in a 52-47 vote. One year later, however, this allegation was labeled a fabricated hoax. The woman who had testified was found to be a member of the Kuwaiti Royal Family living in Paris during the war, and therefore could not have been present during the alleged crime.
Various peace proposals were floated, but none were agreed to. The United States insisted that the only acceptable terms for peace were Iraq\'s full, unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Iraq insisted that withdrawal from Kuwait would have to be “linked” to a simultaneous adherence by neighbouring countries to similar UN resolutions, which would necessitate the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and Israeli troops from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon. Morocco and Jordan were persuaded by this proposal, but Syria, Israel, and the anti-Iraq coalition denied that there was any connection to the Kuwait issue, despite the UN resolutions. Syria joined the coalition to expel Saddam Hussein but Israel remained officially neutral despite rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. The Bush administration persuaded Israel to remain outside the conflict by informing them that the Special Air Service were working behind enemy-lines in Iraq in search of SCUD missile launchers that were being targeted towards Israeli cities.
On January 12, 1991 the United States Congress authorized the use of military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. The votes were 52-47 in the US Senate and 250-183 in the US House of Representatives. These were the closest margins in authorizing force by the Congress since the War of 1812. Soon after, the other states in the coalition also followed suit.
EF-111 Raven - No Coalition aircraft was lost to a radar-guided missile during Desert Storm while an EF-111 was on station.
A day after the deadline set in Resolution, the coalition launched a massive air campaign codenamed Operation Desert Storm with more than 1,000 sorties launching per day. It all began on January 17, 1991, when eight U.S. AH-64 Apache helicopters, and two Pavelow helicopters destroyed Iraqi radar sites near the Iraqi-Saudi Arabian border at 2:38 A.M. Baghdad time, which could have warned Iraq of an upcoming attack. At 2:43 A.M. two EF-111 Ravens with terrain following radar led 22 F-15E Strike Eagles against H-2 and H-3 - airfields in Western Iraq. Minutes later one of the EF-111 crews – Captain James Denton and Captain Brent Brandon – killed an Iraqi Dassault Mirage F-1, when their low altitude maneuvering led the F-1 into the ground. \'As I lie in my tent after performing an all night radar surveillance operation, I remember being annoyed by the percussion of earth shattering bomb explosions.[attribution needed]
At 3 A.M., ten U.S. F-117 Nighthawk Stealth Fighters under the protection of a three-ship formation of EF-111s bombed Baghdad, the capital, killing many civilians.
Within hours of the start of the coalition air campaign, a P-3 Orion called “Outlaw Hunter” developed by the Navy’s Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command. It was testing a highly specialized OTH-T (over the horizon targeting system package) detected a large number of Iraqi patrol boats and naval vessels attempting to make a run from Basra and Um Qasar to Iranian waters. “Outlaw Hunter” vectored in strike elements which attacked the flotilla near Bubiyan Island destroying 11 vessels and damaging scores more.
Concurrently, US Navy BGM-109 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles struck targets in Baghdad, and other coalition aircraft struck targets throughout Iraq. The civilain death toll continued to climb as the attack continued for hours. Government buildings, TV stations, Iraqi Air Force fields and presidential palaces were destroyed. Five hours after the first attacks, Baghdad state radio broadcast a voice identified as Saddam Hussein declaring that “The great duel, the mother of all battles has begun. The dawn of victory nears as this great showdown begins.”
The Persian Gulf War is sometimes called the “computer war” because of the advanced weapons used in the air campaign which included precision-guided munitions (or “smart bombs”) and cruise missiles, although these were very much in the minoritywhen compared with "dumb bombs". Cluster munitions and BLU-82 “Daisy Cutters” were also used. Iraq responded by launching eight Iraqi modified Scud missiles into Israel the next day. These missile attacks on Israel were to continue throughout the six weeks of the war. The first priority for Coalition forces was destruction of the Iraqi air force and anti-aircraft facilities. This was quickly achieved, and for the duration of the war, Coalition aircraft would operate largely unchallenged. Despite Iraq’s better-than-expected anti-aircraft capabilities, only one coalition aircraft, an FA-18 flown by LCDR Scott Speicher, was lost, on the opening day of the war. EA-6Bs, EF-111 radar jammers and F-117A stealth planes were heavily used in this phase to elude Iraq’s extensive SAM systems and anti-aircraft weapons; once these were destroyed, other types of aircraft could be used with near-impunity. The sorties were launched mostly from Saudi Arabia and the six Coalition aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG) in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Persian Gulf CVBGs included USS Midway (CV 41), USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) and USS Ranger (CV-61). USS America (CV-66), USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), and USS Saratoga (CV-60) operated from the Red Sea (USS America transitioned to the Persian Gulf midway through the air war).
The next coalition targets were command and communication facilities. Saddam Hussein had closely micromanaged the Iraqi forces in the Iran-Iraq War and initiative at the lower levels was discouraged. Coalition planners hoped Iraqi resistance would quickly collapse if deprived of command and control.
USAF A-10A Thunderbolt-II ground attack plane over circles of irrigated crops during Desert Storm.
F-14 Tomcats from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf await their turn refuelling from a KC-10A over Iraq during Desert Storm while conducting BONGCAP mission to stop fleeing Iraqi fighters.
The first week of the air war saw a few Iraqi sorties; but these did little damage, and 38 Iraqi MiGs were shot down by Coalition planes. Soon after, the Iraqi Air Force began fleeing to Iran, with 115 to 140 aircraft flown to Iran.Iraqi Air Force Equipment - Introduction. Retrieved on January 18, 2005. The mass exodus of Iraqi aircraft to Iran took coalition forces by surprise as the Coalition had been expecting the aircraft to flee to Jordan, a nation friendly to Iraq rather than Iran, Iraq\'s long-time enemy. The Coalition had placed aircraft over Western Iraq to try and stop such a retreat into Jordan. This meant they were unable to react before most of the Iraqi aircraft had made it "safely" to Iranian airbases. The coalition eventually established a virtual "wall" of F-14 Tomcat fighters on the Iraq border with Iran (called MIGCAP) thereby stopping the exodus of fleeing Iraqi fighters. Iran has never returned the aircraft to Iraq and did not release the aircrews home until years later.
The Iraqi Navy also attempted to escape to Iran, but only one damaged Osa class missile boat managed to get through.
RSAF Tornado during Gulf War
The Iraqi targets were located by aerial photography and were referenced to the GPS coordinates of the US Embassy in Baghdad, which were determined by a USAF officer in August 1990: he arrived at the airport carrying a briefcase with a GPS receiver in it, then an embassy car took him to the embassy. He walked to the embassy courtyard, opened the briefcase, took one GPS reading, and put the machine back in the case. Then he returned to the US gave the GPS receiver to the appropriate intelligence agency in Langley, Virginia, where the position of the US Embassy was officially determined. This position served as the origin for a coordinate system used to designate targets in Baghdad. Clancy, Tom (1994). Armored Cav. Berkley Books, 180. ISBN 0425158365.
Jordan\'s neutrality in the war prompted US fighter jets to bomb highways connecting Iraq and Jordan, causing civilian casualties and crippling infrastructure on both sides.
The Iraqi government reported the high rate of Iraqi civilian casualties to gain support throughout the Muslim world. The US claim the Iraqi government fabricated numerous attacks on Iraqi holy sites in order to rally the Muslim community. One such instance had Iraqi’s reporting that coalition forces attacked the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. The final number of Iraqi civilians killed was 2,278, while 5,965 were reported wounded.Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, 1990-1991 (Princeton, 1993), 324-29.( Almost all of these casualties were from US bombing and missile raids.
On February 13 1991, two laser-guided "smart bombs" destroyed the Amiriyah blockhouse, which was a civilian air shelter, killing hundreds of civilians. US officials claimed that the blockhouse was also a military communications center, a claim validated by Iraqi military leaders after the war.[citation needed] The White House claims, in a report titled Apparatus of Lies: Crafting Tragedy, that US intelligence sources reported the blockhouse was being used for military command purposes.Apparatus of Lies: Crafting Tragedy. Retrieved on December 4, 2005. In his book, Saddam\'s Bombmaker, the former director of Iraq’s nuclear weapon program, who defected to the west, supports the theory that the facility was used for both purposes, as does Iraqi general Georges Sada, who was in charge of POWs taken during combat. Other sources dispute these claims.
Targeting camera showing US missile or bomb strike during Desert Storm - such images became familiar to Western television audiences, and were compared to video games.
If Iraq was to be forced to obey UN resolutions, the Iraqi govenmnet made it no secret that it would respond by attacking Israel, who was allowed to ignore them without any action from the UN. Before the war started, the Christian Tariq Aziz, Iraqi Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, was asked, “if war starts…will you attack Israel?” His response was, “Yes, absolutely, yes.”Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, 1990-1991 (Princeton, 1993), 332.The Iraqis hoped that attacking Israel would draw them into the war. It was expected that this would then lead to the withdrawal of the US\' Arab allies, who would be reluctant to fight alongside the state that was colonising Palestinian land. Israel did not join the coalition, and all Arab states stayed in the coalition. The Scud missiles generally caused fairly light damage, although their potency was felt on February 25 when 28 Us soldiers were killed when a Scud destroyed their barracks in Dhahran. The Scuds targeting Israel were ineffective due to the fact that increasing the range of the Scud resulted in the dramatic reduction in accuracy and payload. Nevertheless, the total of 39 missiles that landed on Israel caused extensive property damage and two direct deaths, and caused the United States to deploy two Patriot missile battalions in Israel in an attempt to deflect the attacks. Allied air forces were also extensively exercised in "Scud hunts" in the Iraqi desert, trying to locate the camouflaged trucks before they fired their missiles at Israel or Saudi Arabia. Three SCUDs (plus a Patriot missile that fell accidentally) hit Ramat Gan in Israel on January 22, 1991, injuring 96 people, and indirectly causing the deaths of three elderly people who died of heart attacks. This was a fraction of the civilian death toll in Iraq. The Israeli policy for the previous forty years had been retaliation, but they decided that discretion was the better part of valour in this instance. After initial hits by SCUD missiles, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir hesitantly refused any retaliating measures against Saddam Hussein, due to increasing pressure from the United States to remain out of the conflict.Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, 1990-1991 (Princeton, 1993), 331-41.
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On January 29, Iraq attacked and occupied the lightly-defended Saudi city of Khafji with tanks and infantry. However, the Battle of Khafji ended when Iraqis were driven back by Saudi forces supported by U.S. Marines with close air support over the following two days. Khafji was a strategic city immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi reluctance to commit several armoured divisions to the occupation and subsequent use of Khafji as a launching pad into the initially lightly defended Eastern portion of Saudi Arabia is considered by many academics as a grave strategic error. Not only would Iraq have secured a majority of Middle Eastern oil supplies, it would have found itself better able to threaten the subsequent U.S. deployment along superior defensive lines.
The effect of the air campaign was to decimate entire Iraqi brigades deployed in the open desert in combat formation. The air campaign also prevented effective Iraqi resupply to forward deployed units engaged in combat, as well preventing a large number (450,000) of Iraqi troops from achieving the force concentration essential to victory.
The air campaign had a significant effect on the tactics employed by opposing forces in subsequent conflicts. No longer were entire divisions dug in the open facing U.S. forces, but were instead dispersed, as with Serbian forces in Kosovo. Opposing forces also reduced the length of their supply lines and the total area defended. This was seen during the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan when the Taliban preemptively abandoned large swaths of land and retreated into their strongholds. This increased their force concentration and reduced long vulnerable supply lines. This tactic was also observed in the invasion of Iraq when the Iraqi forces retreated from northern Iraqi Kurdistan into the cities.
Ground troop movements from February 24-28th 1991 during Operation Desert Storm
The coalition forces dominated the air with their technological advantages, but the ground forces were considered to be more evenly matched up between Iraqis and coalition infantry. The coalition ground forces had the significant advantage of being able to operate under the protection of coalition Air superiority that had been achieved by the Air Forces prior to start of the main ground offensive. Coalition forces also had two key technological advantages: 1. The Coalition Main Battle Tanks such as the American M1 Abrams, British Challenger 1 and Kuwaiti M-84AB were vastly superior to the export version Soviet-built T-72 tanks used by the Iraqis, with crews better trained and armored doctrine better developed;
2. The use of GPS made it possible for Coalition forces to navigate without reference to roads or other fixed landmarks. This allowed them to fight a battle of maneuver rather than a battle of encounter: they knew where they were and where the enemy was, so they could attack a specific target, rather than wandering around aimlessly and firing at whatever hostile forces they bumped into.
The first units into Iraq were three patrols of B squadron of the British Special Air Service, callsigns Bravo One Zero, Bravo Two Zero, and Bravo Three Zero in late January. These eight man patrols landed behind enemy lines to gather intelligence on the movements of Soviet Scud mobile missile launchers, which could not be detected from the air, as during the day they would hide under bridges and camouflage netting. Other objectives included the destruction of fibre optic communications arrays that lay in pipelines, relaying coordinates to the TEL operators launching attacks against Syria.
Elements of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division performed a covert recon into Iraq on 9 February 1991, followed by a recon in force on February 20 that destroyed an Iraqi battalion. On February 22, 1991, Iraq agreed to a Soviet-proposed cease-fire agreement. The agreement called for Iraq to withdraw troops to pre-invasion positions within six weeks following a total cease-fire, and called for monitoring of the cease-fire and withdrawal to be overseen by the UN Security Council. The Coalition rejected the proposal but said that retreating Iraqi forces would not be attacked, and gave twenty-four hours for Iraq to begin withdrawing forces.
Shortly afterwards, the U.S. VII Corps assembled in full strength and launched an armoured attack into Iraq early Sunday, February 24, just to the west of Kuwait, taking Iraqi forces by surprise. Simultaneously, the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps launched a sweeping “left-hook” attack across the largely undefended desert of southern Iraq, led by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR) and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The left flank of this movement was protected by the French 6th Light Armored Division (which included units of the French Foreign Legion). The fast-moving French force quickly overcame the Iraqi 45th Infantry Division, suffering only a handful of casualties, and took up blocking positions to prevent any Iraqi force from attacking the Allied flank. The right flank of the movement was protected by the British 1st Armoured Division. Once the allies had penetrated deep into Iraqi territory, they turned eastward, launching a flank attack against the Republican Guard.
Both sides exchanged fire, but the Republican guard divisions, worn down by weeks of aerial bombardment, proved unable to withstand the Allied advance. Tank battles, including the Battle of Medina Ridge and the Battle of 73 Easting, flared as the Republican Guard attempted to retreat. The Allies won with minimal losses.
General Colin Powell briefs President George H. W. Bush and his advisors on the progress of the ground war.
The "Highway of Death"
The Coalition advance was much swifter than U.S. generals had expected. On February 26, Iraqi troops began retreating out of Kuwait, setting fire to Kuwaiti oil fields as they left. A long convoy of retreating Iraqi troops formed along the main Iraq-Kuwait highway. This convoy was bombed so extensively by the Allies that it came to be known as the Highway of Death. Critics of the action contend that the column also contained prisoners and other fleeing Iraqi civilians, such as families of Iraqi military units.[attribution needed] Forces from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France continued to pursue retreating Iraqi forces over the border and back into Iraq, moving to within 150 miles (240 km) of Baghdad before withdrawing.
One hundred hours after the ground campaign started, President Bush declared a cease-fire and on February 27 declared that Kuwait had been liberated.
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Although it was said at the time that Iraqi troops numbered approximately 545,000 (even 600,000) today most experts think that both the qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the Iraqi Army at the time were exaggerated, as they included both temporary and auxiliary support elements. Many of the Iraqi troops were also young, under-resourced and poorly trained conscripts. The Coalition committed approximately 540,000 troops. In addition to these, a further 100,000 Turkish troops were deployed along the common border of Turkey and Iraq. This caused significant force dilution of the Iraqi military by forcing it to deploy its forces along all its borders. This allowed the main thrust by the Americans to not only possess a significant technological advantage but also a superiority in force numbers.
Saddam Hussein bought military equipment from almost every major dealer of the World\'s weapons market. This resulted in a lack of standardization in this large heterogeneous force, which additionally suffered from poor training and poor motivation. The majority of Iraqi armoured forces still used old Chinese Type-59s and Type-69s, Soviet-made T-55s from the 1950s and 1960s, and some T-72s from the 1970s in 1991. These machines were not equipped with up-to-date equipment, like thermal sight or laser rangefinder, and their effectiveness in modern combat was very limited. The Iraqis failed to find an effective countermeasure to the thermal sights and the sabot rounds used by the M1 Abrams, Challenger 1 and the other Coalition tanks. This equipment enabled Coalition tanks to effectively engage and destroy Iraqi tanks from more than three times the distance that Iraqi tanks could engage. The Iraqi tank crews used old, cheap steel penetrators against the advanced Chobham Armour of these American and British tanks, with disastrous results. The Iraqi forces also failed to utilize the advantage that could be gained from using urban warfare — fighting within Kuwait City — which could have inflicted significant casualties on the attacking forces. Urban combat reduces the range at which fighting occurs and can negate some of the technological advantage that well equipped forces enjoy. Iraqis also tried to copy the Soviet doctrine from the 1950s of mass attacks, but the implementation failed due to the lack of skill of their commanders and the preventive air strikes of the U.S. Air Force on communication centres and bunkers.
A peace conference was held in Iraqi territory occupied by the coalition. At the conference, Iraq won the approval of the use of armed helicopters on their side of the temporary border, ostensibly for government transit due to the damage done to civilian transportation. Soon after, these helicopters, and much of the Iraqi armed forces, were refocused toward fighting against a Shiite uprising in the south. The rebellions were encouraged on 2 February 1991 by a broadcast on CIA run radio station The Voice of Free Iraq broadcasting out of Saudi Arabia. The Arabic service of the Voice of America supported the uprising by stating that the rebellion was large and that they soon would be liberated from Hussein.Robert Fisk. The Great War for Civilization, Vintage (2007 reprint), at p. 646.
In the North, Kurdish leaders took heart in American statements that they would support an uprising and began fighting, in the hopes of triggering a coup. However, when no American support was forthcoming, Iraqi generals remained loyal and brutally crushed the Kurdish troops. Millions of Kurds fled across the mountains to Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran. These incidents would later result in no-fly zones being established in both the North and the South of Iraq. In Kuwait, the Emir was restored and suspected Iraqi collaborators were repressed. Eventually, over 400,000 people were expelled from the country, including a large number of Palestinians (due to their support of and collaboration with Hussein).
There was some criticism of the Bush administration for its decision to allow Saddam Hussein to remain in power, rather than pushing on to capture Baghdad and overthrowing his government. In their co-written 1998 book, A World Transformed, Bush and Brent Scowcroft argued that such a course would have fractured the alliance and would have had many unnecessary political and human costs associated with it.
In 1992, the United States Secretary of Defense during the war, Dick Cheney, made the same point:
"I would guess if we had gone in there, I would still have forces in Baghdad today. We\'d be running the country. We would not have been able to get everybody out and bring everybody home.
And the final point that I think needs to be made is this question of casualties. I don\'t think you could have done all of that without significant additional U.S. casualties, and while everybody was tremendously impressed with the low cost of the (1991) conflict, for the 146 Americans who were killed in action and for their families, it wasn\'t a cheap war.
And the question in my mind is, how many additional American casualties is Saddam (Hussein) worth? And the answer is, not that damned many. So, I think we got it right, both when we decided to expel him from Kuwait, but also when the President made the decision that we\'d achieved our objectives and we were not going to go get bogged down in the problems of trying to take over and govern Iraq.""Cheney changed his view on Iraq", by Charles Pope, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 29, 2004. Retrieved on January 7, 2005.
Instead of greater involvement of its own military, the United States hoped that Saddam Hussein would be overthrown in an internal coup. The Central Intelligence Agency used its assets in Iraq to organize a revolt, but the Iraqi government defeated the effort.
On March 10, 1991, Operation Desert Storm began to move 540,000 American troops out of the Persian Gulf.
Members of the Coalition included Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States of America. Germany and Japan provided financial assistance and donated military hardware instead of direct military assistance, which was later to be known as a "checkbook diplomacy". United States asked Israel not to participate in the war despite missile strikes on Israeli citizens. India extended military support to the United States in the form of refueling facilities situated in the Arabian Sea.
The United Kingdom was numerically the largest European nation to partake in combat operations during the war. Operation Granby was the name for the operations in the Persian Gulf. British Army regiments (mainly with the British 1st Armoured Division), Royal Navy vessels, and Royal Air Force squadrons were mobilized to the Gulf. The Royal Air Force, using various aircraft, operated from airbases in Saudi Arabia. Almost 2,500 armoured vehicles and 43,000 troops were shipped for action.
Chief Royal Navy vessels deployed to the gulf included a number of Broadsword-class frigates, and Sheffield-class destroyers, other RN and RFA ships were also deployed. The light aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal was not deployed to the Gulf area, but was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea.
The second largest European contingent was from France. Operating on the left flank of the US XVIII Airborne Corps, the main French army force was the 6th Light Armoured Division, including troops from the French Foreign Legion. Initially, the French operated independently under national command and control, but coordinated closely with the Americans, Saudis and CENTCOM. In January, the Division was placed under the tactical control of the US XVIII Airborne Corps. France also deployed combat aircraft and naval units. The French called their contribution Opération Daguet
A column of M-113 APCs and other military vehicles of the Royal Saudi Land Force travels along a channel cleared of mines during Operation Desert Storm, Kuwait, 1 March 1991.
Canada was one of the first nations to agree to condemn Iraq\'s invasion of Kuwait and it quickly agreed to join the U.S.-led coalition. In August 1990, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sent the destroyers HMCS Terra Nova and HMCS Athabaskan to join the maritime interdiction force. The supply ship HMCS Protecteur was also sent to aid the gathering coalition forces. The Canadian flotilla lead the coalition logistics force at sea. A fourth ship, HMCS Huron arrived in theatre after hostilies ceased. The ship was the first to visit Kuwait at the end of the war.
After the UN authorized full use of force in the operation Canada sent a